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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
The law is well established that a defendant cannot 
relitigate the denial of a motion to suppress evidence after he 
enters a valid, unconditional guilty plea. Appellant Walter 
Porter entered such a plea. But he asks us to overturn the 
District Court’s order denying his motion to suppress because 
he never intentionally relinquished (i.e., waived) his appellate 
rights, and the Court commented on those rights at sentencing. 
We hold that whether Porter waived his suppression claim is 
immaterial, and that the Court’s statements did not expand 
Porter’s appellate rights. We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction and sentence.  
I 
This case began with a traffic stop in the borough of 
Indiana, Pennsylvania. Police searched the stopped car and 
Case: 18-3268     Document: 003113308104     Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/01/2019
3 
 
found drugs hidden in a “Fix-A-Flat” can inside a duffel bag. 
Porter was seated next to the bag and said it was his. The police 
took Porter into custody, and the United States charged him 
with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C).  
After his indictment, Porter moved to suppress the 
cocaine base, arguing that the search and seizure violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court held an 
evidentiary hearing, and the parties offered conflicting 
testimony. The Court rejected Porter’s version of events, so it 
denied the motion to suppress.  
Several weeks after the evidentiary hearing, Porter 
entered an open guilty plea. In his colloquy with the District 
Court, Porter acknowledged the accuracy of the Government’s 
summary of the evidence. And he agreed no one had “offered 
[him] anything to secure [his] plea of guilty.” Supp. App. 13. 
The District Court found Porter’s plea to be intelligent, 
knowing, voluntary, and supported by the facts. The plea 
hearing concluded with no discussion of the District Court’s 
denial of Porter’s motion to suppress. Nor did sentencing 
memoranda submitted by both parties make any reference to 
appellate issues, much less the suppression of evidence.  
Not until his sentencing hearing months later did Porter 
allude to an appeal. “[T]o preserve the record,” Porter’s 
counsel “respectfully took exception to the Court’s rulings” 
from the suppression hearing. Supp. App. 25. And after the 
District Court sentenced Porter to 84 months’ imprisonment—
a substantial downward variance from the Guidelines range of 
151 to 188 months—the Court informed him of his appellate 
rights. Besides explaining Porter’s right to an appellate 
attorney and the 14-day filing deadline, the Court said, “[s]ir, 
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you have the right to appeal. I know there’s some issues that’s 
[sic] an indication you want to appeal. You have that right. You 
have the right to appeal from your conviction and sentence 
imposed upon you.” Supp. App. 45. Porter filed this timely 
appeal.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And 
although we have said that only “jurisdictional” defenses 
survive a defendant’s unconditional plea of guilty, e.g., 
Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2007) (per 
curiam), the fact that Porter does not challenge the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the District Court or this Court does not 
resolve his case.  
Many courts, including the Supreme Court, “‘have more 
than occasionally misused the term “jurisdictional”’ to refer to 
nonjurisdictional prescriptions.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 
139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848 n.4 (2019) (quoting Scarborough v. 
Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004)). Our Court has been no 
exception. While we have used the word “jurisdiction” in 
precedents like Washington, it has not been to discuss “the 
nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States.” 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) 
(quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 
382 (1884)). In truth, “calling a defense ‘jurisdictional’ [has 
been] a conclusion” that the defense might prevail, “not an 
explanation” why. United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 588 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 
678, 682 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by 
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410 (2010)). We now 
clarify that a claim need not attack subject matter jurisdiction 
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to survive an unconditional guilty plea. In doing so, we join 
many of our sister courts. See, e.g., United States v. Rios-
Rivera, 913 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 
2647 (2019); United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 
947, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). And as we will explain, 
whether a claim survives an unconditional guilty plea depends 
on whether the claim is constitutionally relevant to the 
defendant’s conviction.  
III 
In this appeal, Porter seeks to relitigate the denial of his 
motion to suppress by arguing that the search of his duffel bag 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Precedent precludes 
him from doing so, and his attempts to circumvent that 
precedent are unavailing.  
A 
Courts have long understood a guilty plea to be “a 
confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also 
of the evil intent imputed to the defendant.” Class v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 804 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210 (1869)). Inherent in this confession 
is the defendant’s relinquishment of “not only a fair trial, but 
also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 805 
(quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). As 
relevant here, an unconditional “valid guilty plea ‘results in the 
defendant’s loss of any meaningful opportunity he might 
otherwise have had to challenge the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting 
Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 320 (1983)). This rule is 
founded on the “simpl[e] recogni[tion] that when a defendant 
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is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the 
validity of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged 
Fourth Amendment violation because the conviction does not 
rest in any way on evidence that may have been improperly 
seized.” Haring, 462 U.S. at 321. Instead, the defendant who 
pleads guilty “is convicted on his counseled admission in open 
court that he committed the crime charged against him.” 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773 (1970). The basis 
for Porter’s conviction is thus his solemn and unconditional 
confession of guilt—not the constitutionality of the search that 
discovered the cocaine base in his duffel bag.  
Porter first tries to skirt these formidable precedents by 
arguing that he never “affirmatively waived” his appellate 
rights, whether in a plea agreement or someplace else. Reply 
Br. 3. But Porter’s loss of appellate rights “d[oes] not rest on 
any principle of waiver,” Haring, 462 U.S. at 321, which unlike 
forfeiture is “the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
Rather, it rests on the “irrelevan[ce]” of a Fourth Amendment 
violation “to the constitutional validity of [his] conviction.” 
Haring, 462 U.S. at 321. This concept of constitutional 
irrelevance dates to the “Brady trilogy”: Brady v. United States, 
397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann, 397 U.S. 759, and Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970). See generally 5 Wayne 
R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 21.6(a) (4th ed. 1974 & 
Nov. 2018 update); 1A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 172 (4th ed. 2008 & Apr. 
2019 update). “The Brady trilogy announced the general rule 
that a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made, bars the 
later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial 
proceedings.” Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 288 
Case: 18-3268     Document: 003113308104     Page: 6      Date Filed: 08/01/2019
7 
 
(1975). For instance, a defendant who confesses a crime under 
duress, but later voluntarily pleads guilty to the crime, cannot 
use that unlawful confession to attack his conviction. See 
McMann, 397 U.S. at 773. Nor can a defendant overcome a 
valid plea just because the Supreme Court later held 
unconstitutional one of the penalties he potentially faced for 
his crime. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 746, 757.  
This does not mean that a valid guilty plea insulates a 
conviction against all attacks. Unlike Porter’s unconditional 
plea, the plea itself sometimes “is entered with the clear 
understanding and expectation by the State, the defendant, and 
the courts that it will not foreclose judicial review of the merits 
of the alleged constitutional violations.” Lefkowitz, 420 U.S. at 
290 (special state-law plea allowing evidentiary suppression 
claim); accord United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882, 884 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (conditional federal plea also allowing suppression 
claim). Other times the claim is relevant to the conviction’s 
validity. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Class defines 
claims of this sort. They are defenses which, “‘judged on [their] 
face’ based upon the existing record, would extinguish the 
government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ the 
defendant” if successful. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806 (quoting 
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575 (1989)). Or, to 
borrow a “guiding principle” adopted by Judge Friendly, 
a defendant who has been convicted on a plea of 
guilty may challenge his conviction on any 
constitutional ground that, if asserted before 
trial, would forever preclude the state from 
obtaining a valid conviction against him, 
regardless of how much the state might endeavor 
to correct the defect. In other words, a plea of 
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guilty may operate as a forfeiture of all defenses 
except those that, once raised, cannot be “cured”. 
United States v. Curcio, 712 F.2d 1532, 1538–39 & n.10 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (quoting Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A 
Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in 
Criminal Procedure, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1214, 1226 (1977)).  
With this sweep of the doctrine in mind, Porter’s case is 
clear. Whether Porter waived his rights is not the point. Porter’s 
plea did not allow his evidentiary appeal. Nor would his 
evidentiary appeal, if successful, “extinguish the 
[G]overnment’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ [him]” 
on the “existing record.” Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806 (quoting 
Broce, 488 U.S. at 575). Put differently, a claim that evidence 
is inadmissible is one that may be raised and “cured” before 
trial. Curcio, 712 F.2d at 1539 (quoting Westen, supra, at 
1226). So Porter’s appeal is “irrelevant to the constitutional 
validity of [his] conviction.” Haring, 462 U.S. at 321; accord 
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805.  
B 
Porter also claims his sentencing hearing “created a 
plausible and tangible ambiguity and seemingly expanded [his] 
appellate rights.” Reply Br. 5 (quoting United States v. 
Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2012)). At the start of the 
hearing, defense counsel “preserve[d] the record” on his 
evidentiary objections. Supp. App. 25. Then, after imposing 
sentence, the District Court said to Porter, “I know there’s some 
issues that’s [sic] an indication you want to appeal. You have 
that right.” Supp. App. 45.  
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These comments do not entitle Porter to relitigate his 
suppression motion. Porter’s argument conflates the District 
Court’s statements after sentencing with assurances made 
before the defendant’s guilty plea. Saferstein dealt only with 
the latter. In that case, the district court’s plea colloquy 
misstated the terms of Saferstein’s written appellate waiver. 
The court said the waiver was “not intended to bar [Saferstein] 
from raising constitutional claims,” though the waiver’s text 
said otherwise. Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 241. Saferstein then 
pleaded guilty and sought to raise constitutional claims on 
appeal. We allowed him to do so, because given the district 
court’s representations, we could not be sure Saferstein had 
“knowingly and voluntarily waiv[ed] his appellate rights.” Id. 
at 243; see also United States v. Avila, 733 F.3d 1258, 1260, 
1263 (10th Cir. 2013) (allowing withdrawal of unconditional 
guilty plea because the district court misinformed the 
defendant about appellate rights before accepting plea).  
Unlike Saferstein’s plea colloquy, Porter’s offered no 
assurances about any appellate rights, as Porter candidly 
concedes. Reply Br. 4 n.2. Rather, the District Court advised 
Porter that a plea of guilty would relinquish many 
constitutional rights. Among other things, the Court explained 
that once it accepted Porter’s plea, “at that moment you are no 
longer presumed innocent. You are in the same shoes that you 
would be in had you gone to trial and a jury found you guilty, 
you are now convicted.” Supp. App. 6; see also United States 
v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 2011) (describing the 
defendant’s “substantial burden” under Fed R. Crim. P. 
11(d)(2) if he seeks to withdraw an accepted plea). Porter said 
he understood, he pleaded guilty, and the District Court 
accepted his plea.  
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Just as the District Court warned, that moment 
“represent[ed] a break in the chain of events which ha[d] 
preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258, 267 (1973). This break “render[ed] irrelevant—and 
thereby prevent[ed] [Porter] from appealing—the 
constitutionality of case-related [G]overnment conduct that 
t[ook] place before the plea [was] entered.” Class, 138 S. Ct. 
at 805. To hold differently would allow Porter to challenge his 
admitted guilt because of alleged ambiguities about appellate 
rights that arose at sentencing. Cf. Betterman v. Montana, 136 
S. Ct. 1609, 1616 (2016) (“[F]actual disputes, if any there be, 
at sentencing, do not go to the question of guilt; they are 
geared, instead, to ascertaining the proper sentence within 
boundaries set by statutory minimums and maximums.”). We 
decline to “degrade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty 
into something akin to a move in a game of chess.” United 
States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997).  
* * * 
In sum, Porter cannot challenge on appeal the denial of 
his motion to suppress because his Fourth Amendment claims 
are irrelevant to his judgment of conviction, which was entered 
following a valid and unconditional guilty plea. We will affirm.  
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